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Abstract—Real-world deployments of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) require secure communication. Recently, WSNs and
traditional IP networks are more tightly integrated using IPv6
and 6LoWPAN. Available IPv6 protocol stacks can use IPsec to
secure data exchange. Thus, it is desirable to extend 6LoWPAN
such that IPsec communication with IPv6 nodes is possible. It
is beneficial to use IPsec because the existing end-points on the
Internet do not need to be modified to communicate securely
with the WSN.
We propose a 6LoWPAN extension for IPsec. Our extension
supports both IPsec’s Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsu-
lation Security Payload (ESP). Thus, communication endpoints
are able to authenticate, encrypt, and check the integrity of
messages using standardized and established IPv6 mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks can be tightly integrated with
existing IP based infrastructures using IPv6 over Low Power
Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN). Sensor nodes
using 6LoWPAN can directly communicate with IPv6 enabled
hosts. IPv6 hosts in the Internet support by default IPsec
for secure communication. Therefore, if data flows between
IPv6 hosts and 6LoWPAN sensor nodes it is desirable to take
advantage of existing capabilities and to secure traffic using
IPsec. Thus, we propose to add IPsec support to 6LoWPAN.
IPsec defines an Authentication Header (AH) [3] and an
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [4]. The AH can be
used to provide data integrity and authentication while ESP
provides data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. Ei-
ther AH, ESP or both can be used to secure IPv6 packets in
transit. It is up to the application to specify which security
services are required. 6LoWPAN uses header compression
techniques to ensure that the large IPv6 and transport-layer
headers (UDP/TCP) are reduced. By supporting IPsec’s AH
and ESP additional IPv6 extension headers have to be included
in each packet. Thus, it is important to ensure that compression
techniques are as well applied to these extension headers. The
main contributions of this paper is the specification of IPsec
for 6LoWPAN including definitions for AH and ESP extension
headers. Prior to this work no specification for IPsec in the
context of 6LoWPAN existed.
To test our IPsec extension for 6LoWPAN we extend the
IP and 6LoWPAN implementation in the Contiki operating
system [2]. Our results [5] clearly demonstrate that IPsec is
a viable option for 6LoWPANs. On acceptance of this paper
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Fig. 1. LOWPAN NHC EH: NHC encoding for IPv6 Extension Header
II. 6LOWPAN AND IPSEC
6LoWPAN [1] aims at integrating existing IP based in-
frastructures and sensor networks by specifying how IPv6
packets are to be transmitted over an IEEE 802.15.4 network.
The maximum physical-layer packet size of 802.15.4 packet
is 127byte and the maximum frame header size is 25byte.
An IPv6 packet has therefore to fit in 102byte. Given that
packet headers of a packet would already consume 48byte of
the available 102byte it is obvious that header compression
mechanisms are an essential component of the 6LoWPAN
standard. IPsec too requires header compression to keep packet
sizes reasonable in 6LoWPAN. Unfortunately, there are no
header encodings specified for AH and ESP extension headers.
In this section we therefore propose these extension header
encodings.
A. LOWPAN NHC Extension Header Encoding
HC13 defines context aware header compression using
IPHC for IP header compression and NHC for the next
header compression. The HC13 defines the general format
of NHC that starts with variable length ID bits and then
contains encodings for the compressed next header. We define
NHC encodings for the two IP extension header namely AH
and ESP, and optionally for one newly proposed IPSEC, see
Section II-D. 6LoWPAN already defines NHC encodings for
IP extension headers (NHC EH) that can be used to link
AH and ESP extension headers. NHC encodings for the IPv6
Extension Headers consist of a NHC octet where three bits
(bits 4,5,6) are used to encode the IPv6 Extension Header ID
(EID). The NHC EH encoding for extension headers is shown
in Figure 1.
Out of eight possible values for the EID, six are specified
by the HC13 draft.The remaining two slots (101 and 110) are
currently reserved. We provide three proposals to use these
free slots.
1) The first proposal is to use one reserve slot, say 101, to
identify that the next header is IPsec header. The ID bits
in the proposed NHC for AH and ESP identify that the
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Fig. 2. NHC AH: NHC encoding for IPv6 Authentication Header
2) In the second proposal we use one reserve slot like
proposal 1. However, we define one additional NHC for
IPsec, see Section II-D. This will incur an overhead of
one additional byte. However, this is a flexible way that
can also help to compress upper layer security protocols.
3) The third proposal is a bit cleaner but uses both reserve
slots in the NHC EH: one to encode AH and other to
encode ESP. In this case we do not necessarily need
ID bits in the AH or ESP because the EID field of
the previous NHC EH identifies the next header that
will be either AH or ESP. However to comply with
6LoWPAN standard we set these ID bits accordingly
in our proposals.
It is also necessary to set the last bit in NHC EH to 1 to
specify that the next header (AH or ESP) is encoded using
NHC.
B. LOWPAN NHC AH Encoding
We define the NHC encoding for the AH. Our proposed
NHC for AH is shown in Figure 2.
We describe the function of each header field:
 The first four bits in the NHC AH represent the NHC ID
we define for AH. These are set to 1101.
 If PL = 0: The payload length (length of the IPsec
header) field in AH is omitted. This length can be
obtained from the SPI value because the length of the
authenticating data depend on the algorithm used and are
fixed for any input size.
If PL = 1: The payload value is carried inline after the
NHC AH header.
 If SPI = 0: the default SPI for the sensor network is
used and the SPI field is omitted. We set the default SPI
value to 1. SPI 0 is reserved to indicate that no security
association exists. This does not mean that all nodes use
the same security association (SA), but that every node
has a single preferred SA, identified by SPI 1.
If SPI = 1: All 32 bits indicating the SPI are carried
inline after the NHC AH header.
 If SN = 0: A 16 bit sequence number is used. The left
most 16 bits are assumed to be zero.
If SN = 1: All 32 bits of the sequence number are carried
inline after the NHC AH header.
 If NH = 0: The next header field in AH will be used to
specify the next header and it is carried inline.
If NH = 1: The next header field in AH is skipped. The
next header will be encoded using NHC.
The minimum length of a standard AH supporting the
mandatory HMAC-SHA1-96 is 24byte. After optimal com-
pression we obtain a header size of 16byte. Figure 3 shows
compressed IPv6/UDP packet secured with AH using HMAC-
SHA1-96.
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Fig. 4. LOWPAN NHC ESP: NHC encoding for IPv6 ESP
C. LOWPAN NHC ESP Encoding
Figure 4 shows the NHC encodings we propose for ESP.
We describe the function of each header field:
 The first 4 bits in the NHC ESP represent the NHC ID
we define for ESP. These are set to 1110.
 If SPI = 0: The default SPI for the sensor network is
used and the SPI field is omitted. We set the default SPI
value to 0.
If SPI = 1: All 32 bits indicating the SPI are carried
inline after the NHC ESP header.
 If SN = 0: A 16 bit sequence number is used. The left
most 16 bits are assumed to be zero.
If SN = 1: All 32 bits of the sequence number are carried
inline after the NHC ESP header.
 If NH = 0: The next header field in ESP will be used
to specify the next header and it is carried inline.
If NH = 1: The next header field in ESP is skipped.
The next header will be encoded using NHC. This is only
possible if hosts are able to execute 6LoWPAN compres-
sion/decompression and encryption/decryption jointly.
Recall that the minimum ESP overhead without authen-
tication, AES-CBC and perfect block alignment is 18byte.
After optimal compression this header overhead is reduced
to 12byte. ESP with authentication (HMAC-SHA1-96) has
an overhead of 30byte which is reduced to 24byte using the
outlined ESP compression.
If ESP is used it is not possible to compress upper layer
headers such as UDP. A 6LoWPAN gateway between sensor
network and IP network cannot access and expand the en-
crypted UDP header. To enable UDP compression with ESP
we need to specify a new encryption algorithm for ESP which
is able to perform UDP header compression and encryption.
D. LOWPAN NHC IPSEC Encoding
We define the NHC encoding for the additional IPSEC. Our
proposed NHC for IPSEC is shown in Figure 5.
We describe the function of each header field:
 The first four bits in the NHC AH represent the NHC ID
we define for AH. These are set to 1100.
3Service Uncompressed IPsec Compressed IPsec 802.15.4
Mode Bytes Mode Bytes Mode Bytes
AH Authentication HMAC-SHA1-96 24 HMAC-SHA1-96 16 AES-CBC-MAC-96 12
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Fig. 5. NHC IPSEC: NHC encoding for our proposed IPsec header
 If NSH = 0: The next header is NHC compressed AH
header.
If PL = 1: The next header is NHC compressed ESP
header.
 UL field can take four values that can be used to
define 6LoWPAN compression for UDP/TCP payload.
We propose to use these bits as follows.
– 00 : The UDP payload is NHC compressed Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) header. IKE is uniquely iden-
tified by 500 or 4500.
– 01 : The UDP or TCP payload is NHC compressed
TLS or UTLS Record Protocol header, respectively.
The current 6LoWPAN draft does not specify NHC
for TCP.
– Slot 10 and 11 are reserved and can be used for other
upper layer compressions.
 If NH = 0: The next header (either AH or ESP) will be
carried inline.
If NH = 1: The next header will be encoded using NHC.
E. IPsec Vs. IEEE 802.15.4 Security: Packet Overhead
Currently WSN communication is secured using 802.15.4
link-layer security. This security mechanism can only provide
hop-by-hop security and, in contrast to our IPsec imple-
mentation, lacks the ability to provide proper end-to-end-
security. Nevertheless, we provide here a comparison of packet
overheads between 802.15.4 link-layer security and IPsec
security. Table I summarizes the packet overhead when using
uncompressed IPsec, compressed IPsec and 802.15.4 link-
layer security, with IPsec standardized algorithms.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have given a specification of IPsec for
6LoWPAN. WSNs will be an integral part of the Internet
of the future. Communication between hosts and nodes in
sensor networks will be commonplace. The research com-
munity and industry agrees that IP and 6LoWPAN are the
protocol standards that will be used to bring the Internet and
WSNs together. IPsec is the standard method to secure IP
communication and it is therefore reasonable to investigate if
this mechanism can be extended to reach nodes within the
WSN.
This paper shows that a compressed IPsec is a sensible
and viable choice for 6LoWPANs. The key advantage of
using IPsec in WSN is that we achieve end-to-end IP based
communication between a sensor device and Internet hosts.
While using IPsec, the IEEE 802.15.4 security features can be
disabled as security services are provided in the IP layer.
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